Bayesian games with a continuum of states by Hellman, Ziv & Levy, Yehuda John
BAYESIAN GAMES WITH A CONTINUUM OF STATES
ZIV HELLMAN
Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
YEHUDA JOHN LEVY
Department of Economics and Nuffield College, University of Oxford,
Oxford, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT. We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic
types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowl-
edge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge rela-
tion that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common
knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game
will not have any Bayesian equilibrium. We show that our smoothness
condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with
a continuum of types: the impossibility of having a common prior on
components when a common prior over the entire state space exists, and
the possibility of interim betting/trade even when no such trade can be
supported ex ante.
1. INTRODUCTION
When are Bayesian games guaranteed to have Bayesian equilibria? One
answer to that question was given in Harsa´nyi (1967), the same work that
introduced the common prior assumption, by reducing the question of the
existence of Bayesian equilibria to the question of existence of Nash equi-
libria in an associated game of complete information. As the latter always
exist, so do Bayesian equilibria.
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Harsa´nyi’s Theorem on the existence of Bayesian equilibria, however,
was proved only for Bayesian games in which all variables are finite. That
is, it holds for games with a finite number of players, finite action spaces,
finite payoff parameters and a finite number of possible types.
When state spaces have continuum many states, Harsa´nyi’s Theorem
no longer holds. Simon (2003) presented an example of a three-player
Bayesian game over a continuum of states with no measurable Bayesian
equilibrium.1 This was extended in Hellman (2014a), which contains an
example of a two-player Bayesian game over a continuum of states with no
Bayesian ε-equilibrium for sufficiently small ε.
The main results of this paper deal with conditions for the existence of
Bayesian equilibria and common priors when the state and type spaces are
infinite. Theorem 1 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of mea-
surable Bayesian equilibria within the class of Bayesian games over con-
tinuum of states. These conditions are that (i) in every state of the world
each individual belief is purely atomic and (ii) the common knowledge re-
lation is smooth, that is, the common knowledge components are precisely
the level sets of some measurable function. The theorem also establishes
a certain necessity of the smoothness, showing that when it does not hold,
there are payoffs and types with precisely this common knowledge structure
for which measurable Bayesian equilibria do not exist.
Continuum state spaces also present challenges relating to the concept of
the common prior. Simon (2000) presented an example in which the very
existence of a common prior depends on whether one is looking at the ex
ante stage or the interim stage. That is, common priors exist globally in the
full state space in the ex ante stage but do not exist over any common knowl-
edge component (i.e., in the interim stage). This is so counter-intuitive that
Heifetz (2006) conjectured (using the concept of common improper pri-
ors) that despite the lack of consistency in the existence of common priors
in such examples there would still be behavioural consistency in terms of
agreement, i.e., agents would consistently agree not to trade in both the ex
ante stage and the interim stage.
This leads us to the other results of this paper: in Theorems 2 and 3 we
show that exactly the same smoothness conditions that characterise which
games necessarily possess Bayesian equilibria also provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for ex ante/interim stage consistency of the existence
of common priors and no trade/no betting theorems in continuum of states.
1 Restricting attention to the question of the existence of measuable equilibria is not
truly restrictive: given a game without measurable Bayesian equilibria one can always
construct another game, with an additional player whose payoffs depend on the strategies
of the players in the original game, that has no well-defined equilibria at all.
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In particular, the conjecture of Heifetz (2006) is wrong; there are examples
of behavioural inconsistency, with agents unable to agree to trade ex ante
but agreeing to trade in the interim stage whenever the common knowledge
relation is non-smooth.
Smoothness is a critical condition in the main results here, both those
relating to measurable Bayesian equilibria and consistency of common prior
existence. Intuitively, non-smooth models appear to be rare and unusual
cases, requiring a conscious effort to conjure up. It would appear that most
applications of Bayesian games with a continuum of states in which one
would be interested in, such as models of profits, elapsed time, accumulated
resources, and so on, are more likely than not to satisfy the conditions for
the existence of measurable equilibria.
With respect to the existence of measurable Bayesian equilibria in games
with continuum-many types, a seminal paper by Milgrom and Weber (1985)
proved that such equilibria exist when players have absolutely continuous
information. However, the class of smooth games which are established to
have equilibria in this paper are a subset of a different class CIC, the class
of games with a subset of continuously distributed informational common-
ality introduced by Stinchcombe (2011a), which in turn is a subclass of
DIS, games with discontinuous information structures. All the results in
Milgrom and Weber (1985) assume the condition of absolutely continuous
information, which means that they are disjoint from DIS and hence not
applicable at all to the games here.
In his paper, Stinchcombe (2011a) shows that for games in CIC with
generic payoff functions the expected payoffs of the players will not be
continuous as functions of the strategy profiles. When the expected payoffs
are continuous as a function of the players’ behavioural strategies, which
are functions from players’ knowledge to actions, Bayesian equilibria ex-
ist. The smooth games in this paper are elements of CIC, leading to the
conclusion that although generically the expected payoffs of those games
are not continuous, they are nevertheless guaranteed by Theorem 1 to have
Bayesian equilibria. More details may be found in Section 6.3.
We conclude by noting that during the composition of this paper some
perhaps surprising parallels between concepts used in game theory and de-
scriptive set theory concepts were uncovered. For example, a regular condi-
tional distribution t of a probability measure µ parallels the posterior t of a
prior µ with respect to a knowledge structure; the saturation of a point with
respect to a countable Borel equivalence relation corresponds to the knowl-
edge component of a state in an epistemic game theoretic model. Hopefully,
these sorts of parallels can be deepened in future research, leading to more
new results.
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2. PRELIMINARIES AND THE MODEL
2.1. Smoothness. As standard, a Polish space is a separable, completely
metrisable space. Measurability without further qualification in this paper,
in the context of a Polish spaceX , will be understood to mean measurability
with respect to the Borel σ-algebra of X .
A relation E on a Polish space Ω is said to be Borel if it is Borel as a
subset of Ω × Ω. In other words, the relation is Borel if the set {(x, y) ∈
Ω× Ω | xEy} is a Borel subset of Ω× Ω. It is said to be countable if each
equivalence class, referred to as classes or atoms, is countable. We will
abbreviate countable Borel equivalence relation as CBER.
A very central definition from descriptive set theory that is used exten-
sively in this paper is:
Definition 1. A Borel equivalence relation E on a Polish space Ω is smooth
if there is a Polish space Y and a Borel function ψ : Ω → Y such that for
all x, y ∈ Ω
(2.1) xEy ⇐⇒ ψ(x) = ψ(y)
(i.e., the classes of E are precisely the level sets of ψ.) 
If E is the common knowledge relation, a function ψ witnessing the
smoothness of the relation can be thought of as an auxiliary tool that en-
ables us to ascertain when x and y are in the same common knowledge
component: that occurs if and only if ψ(x) = ψ(y).
A transversal of E is a set T ⊆ X which intersects each E equivalence
class at exactly one point. It is easy to see that if a Borel E has a Borel
transversal then it is smooth: intuitively, the map ψ(x) = ‘the only element
of T that is E-equivalent to x’ witnesses the smoothness of E. For CBER’s,
the converse is true as well.
From this one can show that if every equivalence class of E is finite then
E is smooth. We will use this fact repeatedly. Consider the set
T = {x ∈ X ∣∣ ∀y ∈ X, xEy =⇒ x ≤ y},
i.e., the set of the ≤-elements of the E equivalence classes, for any Borel
linear order on the domain of E; such exists by a theorem of Kuratowski.
This T is seen to be Borel and a transversal of E, hence finiteness of the
E-classes is sufficient for smoothness; for details, see, e.g., Example 6.1 of
Kechris and Miller (2004). However, for CBER’s, which are the focus of
much of the material of this paper, matters are not so simple.
When E is an equivalence relation, for each x ∈ Ω, one may consider
the class containing x, which we denote by [x]E. A set B ⊆ Ω is said to be
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saturated with respect to E if it is the union of E-equivalence classes, i.e.,
if there is a set A ⊆ Ω such that B = [A]E := ∪x∈A[x]E. The collection
of all the Borel E-saturated sets of a Borel equivalence relation E forms a
σ-algebra, denoted σ(E).
2.2. Proper Regular Conditional Distributions. Game theorists are used
to working with priors and posteriors. The appropriate generalisation to the
context of the structures in this paper makes use of the concept of proper
regular conditional distributions.
For a Polish space X , let ∆(X) denote the space of regular Borel prob-
ability distributions on X , with the topology of weak convergence of prob-
ability measures, and let ∆f (X) ⊆ ∆(X) (resp. ∆a(X) ⊆ ∆(X)) denote
the subspace of finitely supported (resp. purely atomic) measures. ∆(X) is
itself a Polish space.
If (Ω,B) is a measurable space, µ ∈ ∆(Ω), and F is a sub-σ-algebra of
B, then (see Blackwell and Ryll-Nardzewski (1963)) a proper regular con-
ditional distribution (henceforth, proper RCD) of µ, given F, is a mapping
t : Ω×B→ [0, 1] such that for each B ∈ B, ω → tω(B) is Borel, and such
that:
(2.2) µ(B) =
∫
Ω
tω(B)dµ(ω), for all B ∈ B
and
tω(A) = 1, for µ-a.e. ω ∈ A ∈ F
It can be shown that (2.2) implies that for every T ∈ B
tω(T ) = Eµ[1T | F](ω), µ-a.e. ω ∈ Ω
In terms that may be more familiar for game theorists, a proper RCD t of a
probability measure µ may be thought of as the posterior t of a prior µ with
respect to a knowledge structure F = σ(E).
2.3. Knowledge Spaces. Most game theory models2 work with partition-
ally generated type spaces. In such models, where Ω is finite or countable,
each player i has a partition Πi of Ω. This approach suffers from a difficulty
in the case a continuum of states, since the partition has to ‘agree’ with the
measurable structure. In addition, in the continuum case one cannot work
with arbitrary unions of partitions elements; only Borel unions are admissi-
ble. Our approach differs from the more classical approach given in Nielson
(1984) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) – see below, Section 6.2, for
2 This can be broadened to: nearly all models in the economics, game theory, and the
decision theory literature.
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more details on this – in favour of defining knowledge via relations (instead
of σ-algebras), which is better suited for the class of purely atomic types
that will concern us. Our approach also differs from the ‘types’ approach of
Milgrom and Weber (1985); see Section 6.1.
We will work in general with a non-empty, finite set of players I and a
Polish space of states Ω. With each player i we associate a Borel equiva-
lence relation over Ω denoted Ei, called i’s knowledge relation. Intuitively,
the unions of classes of Ei represent the events that Player i can identify;
hence, σ(Ei) is the set of Borel events that Player i can identify. (In the
discrete setting in which knowledge spaces are generated from knowledge
partitions Πi of Ω, σ(Ei) would be given by the unions of elements of Πi.)
Adopting the convention that E stands for the profile of knowledge rela-
tions (Ei)i∈I , a knowledge space is then a triple (Ω, I,E ). Given a knowl-
edge space (Ω, I,E ), the equivalence relation induced by E , which will
be denoted by E, is the transitive closure of the union ∪i∈IEi; i.e., the
smallest equivalence relation containing each element in E . Observe that
σ(E) = ∩i∈Iσ(Ei). In terms that may be more familiar, E is the common
knowledge equivalence relation. The class of the common knowledge rela-
tion E containing ω is called the common knowledge component containing
ω, and is denoted C (ω).
2.4. Type Spaces and Priors. Fix a knowledge space (Ω, I,E ). For each
i ∈ I , a type function ti is a mapping ti : Ω → ∆(Ω) that is σ(Ei)-
measurable and satisfies tiω(A) = 1 whenever ω ∈ A ∈ σ(Ei).
Adopting the convention that t stands for the tuple (ti)i∈I , a triple (Ω, I, t)
is called a type space. A type space implicitly defines the knowledge rela-
tions Ei underlying the type functions: ωEiω′ (i.e., (ω, ω′) ∈ Ei) if and only
if tiω = t
i
ω′ . Intuitively, t
i
ω(B) is the probability player i associates to the set
B in state ω.
A measure µi ∈ ∆(Ω) such that ti is a proper RCD for µi given σ(Ei) is
a prior for ti. A common prior is a measure µ that is a prior for the type
functions of all the players i ∈ I .
2.5. Purely Atomic Positive Spaces. We adopt two main restrictive as-
sumptions on type spaces. The assumption of positivity, meaning that every
state in a player’s knowledge component is ascribed non-zero probability by
his type in said component, is convenient but not really necessary for our
results. In contrast, the other supposition, of countable support for every
type, is a substantively needed assumption.
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Definition 2. A type space satisfying the conditions that tiω ∈ ∆f (Ω),3 for
all i ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω, will be called a finitely supported type space. 
Definition 3. A type space such that for all i ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω, the type tiω
is purely atomic (i.e., has countable support), will be called a purely atomic
type space. 
We will always assume that types are purely atomic. (Occasionally, we
will also require them to be finitely supported.) In addition, we will hence-
forth assume all type spaces satisfy positivity:
Definition 4. A type space such that for all i ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω, tiω[ω] > 0
is called positive. (More generally, if t is a proper r.c.d. of µ w.r.t F, t is
called positive if tω[ω] > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.)4
When positivity does not hold, the set of states that violated it are of
measure zero under any prior, see Proposition 7 in the Appendix; hence,
positivity is a fairly benign and merely technical assumption. In combina-
tion, pure atomicity and positivity imply that each class of each player’s
knowledge relation is countable, and hence so are the classes of the com-
mon knowledge equivalence relation.5 In this case the knowledge relation
of each player is always smooth and the knowledge sets of each player are
the level sets of his type function.
Definition 5. A CBER is belief induced if there are finitely many smooth
CBER’s that generate it. 
Lemma 19 implies that a CBER is belief induced if and only if it is
the common knowledge relation of some finitely supported positive type
3 Recall that ∆f (Ω) is the set of finitely supported measures over Ω, hence finite support
is equivalent to each player ascribing positive probability only to a finite number of ele-
ments in all knowledge components. Type spaces with finite fanout, as defined in Simon
(2003), in which each partition element of the underlying partionally-based knowledge
space contains only a finite number of elements, are a special case of this, although these
classes coincidence if positivity (see Definition 4) is assumed.
4 The restriction to positive type spaces is not a serious one and is implemented largely
for convenience and simplicity. Theorem 2 only relies on this assumption to guarantee that
a weaker assumption holds, namely that the knowledge classes of each player are count-
able. Theorem 3.I, which follows from Theorem 2, could similarly be proved under this
weaker assumption. Theorems 1.II and Theorem 3.II deliver constructions in which posi-
tivity is guaranteed anyway. Only the proof of Theorem 1.I makes direct use of positivity
instead of the above weaker condition, in particular Proposition 11; this, too, can be relaxed
at the expense of a more complicated proof.
5 This can be shown easily if one builds the common knowledge relation inductively
from the players’ knowledge relations, as done in Section 7.1.
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space.6 Not all CBER’s are belief induced.7 We elaborate on this in Appen-
dix 8.
2.6. Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibria.
A Bayesian game Γ = (Ω, I, t, A, r) consists of the following compo-
nents:
• (Ω, I, t) forms a type space (with knowledge relations E understood
implicitly as generated by t).
• A = (Ai)i∈I is a tuple consisting of a finite action set for each Player
i ∈ I .
• r : Ω ×∏i∈I Ai → RI is a bounded measurable payoff function,
with ri then being the resulting payoff to player i. The payoff func-
tion r extends multi-linearly to mixed actions in the usual manner.
A strategy of a player i ∈ I is a mapping si : Ω→ ∆(Ai) which is constant
on each player’s knowledge component. In other words, if ω, ω′ ∈ Ω are in
the same atom of Ei, i.e., tiω[ω
′] > 0, then si(ω) = si(ω′).
A Bayesian ε-equilibrium, with ε ≥ 0, is a profile of strategies s =
(si)i∈I such that for each i ∈ I , all ω ∈ Ω,8 and each alternative strategy
x ∈ ∆(Ai) of player i,9
∑
{ω′|tiω [ω′]>0}
ri(ω′, s(ω′))tiω[ω
′] + ε ≥
∑
{ω′|tiω [ω′]>0}
ri(ω′, x, s−i(ω′))tiω[ω
′]
6 On a knowledge relation with finite classes, one can define a type function which is
uniform over each class.
7 The authors are grateful to Benjamin Weiss for pointing this out.
8 If there is a common prior, the definition can be modified to require ε-optimality of
the strategy in almost every state.
9Recall that we have assumed types are purely atomic and payoffs are bounded.
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When a Bayesian ε-equilibrium s satisfies the condition that each si is Borel
measurable,10 s is said to be a measurable11 Bayesian ε-equilibrium (ε-
MBE). When ε = 0 we will refer simply to an MBE instead of a 0-MBE.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Measurable Bayesian Equilibria. Our main claim is that smoothness
of type spaces is crucial for many results, including the existence of measur-
able equilibria in Bayesian games, the persistence of common priors over
components and consistency of no betting in the ex ante and interim stages.
These are all detailed in this section.
Definition 6. A purely atomic positive type space whose common knowl-
edge relation is smooth will be called a smooth type space. A Bayesian
game whose underlying type space is smooth will be called a smooth Bayesian
game. 
Sometimes we will want to specify exactly how a type space fails to be
smooth:
Definition 7. Let E be a non-smooth belief-induced CBER. Then a type
space τ whose underlying common knowledge relation is Ewill be called an
E-non-smooth type space. A Bayesian game whose underlying type space
is E-non-smooth will called a E-non-smooth Bayesian game. 
Theorem 1 extends Harsa´nyi’s Theorem, essentially stating that (within
the class of purely atomic type spaces) a Bayesian game is guaranteed to
have a measurable Bayesian equilibrium if and only if it is smooth. Theo-
rem 1 also resolves the paradox appearing in Section 4.2.1.
Theorem 1.
I. Every smooth Bayesian game has an MBE.
10 The combination of being Borel measurable and being constant in each knowledge
component of Player i is equivalent to requiring that si is σ(Ei)-measurable.
11 It is possible for a game to have Bayesian ε-equilibria that are not measurable as
in, for example, Simon (2003). However, for our purposes it will suffice to concentrate
on characterising the existence of measurable ε-equilibria, because given a game Γ that
admits only non-measurable equilibria it is always possible to create another game Γ′ that
has no equilibria at all. This is accomplished by adding an additional player k to Γ′ who
is not in the player set of Γ. The payoffs of players i 6= k in Γ′ are defined to be exactly
identical to their payoffs in Γ, while k’s payoff is given by an integral over the actions of the
players i 6= k. But if the equilibrium strategies of the players i 6= k are non-measurable,
at equilibrium player k cannot even define a payoff, much less an optimal strategy. See
Hellman (2014a) for an explicit example of such a construction.
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II. Conversely, for every non-smooth belief-induced CBER E there is
an E-non-smooth Bayesian game Γ that has no MBE.
In part II, the types can be constructed to be positive, have finitely sup-
ported types, and a common prior, and such that the game Γ in fact does not
possess an ε-MBE for ε > 0 small enough.
To prove Theorem 1.I we proceed in three steps. Firstly, we will de-
velop a notion of the space of all (positive) Bayesian games with countably
many states S, player set I and set of actions A (Proposition 11), which we
will denote byB(S, I, A) (or justB for short). Secondly, we then prove the
existence of a Bayesian equilibrium selection for this class of games (Corol-
lary 13). Finally, we show that one can measurably map the games induced
on each common knowledge component of a general game into the space
of games on countably many states S (Proposition 14). The composition of
this mapping and the Bayesian equilibrium selection from the second step
will give us the required global Bayesian equilibrium.
We can construct such a mapping because the smoothness, it turns out,
allows us measurably to enumerate the elements of each atom, and once we
have this enumeration we can map the game on each atom to its appropriate
game in the space B; when we lack such an enumeration, this cannot be
done because we have no canonical way to select the mapping. Details are
given in Section 7.3.
For the proof of 1.II, we embed the game given in Hellman (2014a) which
does not have an ε-MBE into the given structure, using known theorems on
embedding countable Borel equivalence relations into each other.
3.2. Common Priors over Components. Let τ = (Ω, I, t) be a type
space with common knowledge relation E. Let K ∈ σ(E), that is, K is
a common knowledge event. Writing tK for for the restriction of the profile
of types toK, (ti|K)i∈I , one has that τK := (K, I, tK) is a well-defined type
space over K. This is true in particular if K is an atom of E. Similarly, we
write E|X for the restriction of the equivalence relation E to X; formally,
E|X = (X ×X) ∩ E.
Definition 8. If µ is a common prior, then we say that a property holds for
almost every common knowledge component if the set of components for
which it does not hold are all contained in a µ-null set. 
Theorem 2 essentially states that given a type space τ with a common
prior, the type space τK for any common knowledge component K is guar-
anteed also to have a common prior if and only if the underlying common
knowledge relation is smooth almost everywhere. Theorem 2 also resolves
the paradox appearing in Section 4.2.2.
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Theorem 2. Let τ be a type space with a common prior µ and common
knowledge relation E. The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) There exists X ∈ σ(E) with µ(X) = 1 such that E|X is smooth.
(2) For almost every common knowledge component K, the type space
τK has a common prior.
(3) There is a proper RCD t of µ given σ(E) such that for almost every
common knowledge component K and each x ∈ K, tx is a common
prior for τK .
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Section 7.4. The main step is to show that
(1) implies (2). The key here is to show that for each player i, if one first
takes the regular conditional distribution of µ with respect to σ(E) and then
from that one takes the conditional distribution with respect to player i’s
knowledge structure, one recovers i’s original type.
3.3. No Betting. For a type space τ a bet is a list of (f i)i∈I of bounded12
random variables f i : Ω → R such that ∑i∈I f i(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. An
acceptable bet is a bet that satisfies the condition that
(3.1) Ei[f i | ω] =
∫
Ω
f i(s)dtiω[s] > 0 for all i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω.
In words, an acceptable bet is a bet that each player believes, based on his
type function, that he is guaranteed to win no matter what the true state of
the world is, despite the fact that the bet is zero sum at each state. If a type
space admits no acceptable bets then we say that there is no betting over the
type space.
Theorem 3 essentially states that we are only guaranteed that almost all
common knowledge components possess no acceptable bets (i.e., there are
no acceptable bets at the interim stage) when the common knowledge rela-
tion is smooth. Theorem 3 also resolves the paradox appearing in Section
4.2.3.
The condition guaranteeing consistency in agreeing to trade between the
ex ante and interim stages thus turns out to be virtually identical to the
condition guaranteeing the existence of measurable equilibria in Bayesian
games (as in Theorem 1). On the one hand, smoothness guarantees com-
mon priors on components, which excludes admissible bets. On the other
hand, when smoothness fails, games in which betting is admissible on com-
ponents, like that in Section 4.2.3, can be embedded in the structure.
Theorem 3.
12 We assume boundedness to avoid anomalies; see Feinberg (2000) and Hellman
(2014b).
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I. A smooth type space with a common prior admits no betting over
almost every common knowledge component.
II. Conversely, for every non-smooth belief-induced CBER E there is
an E-non-smooth (positive, finitely supported) type space with a
common prior such that on almost every common knowledge com-
ponent there exists an acceptable bet.
The proof of Theorem 3.I is given in Section 7.4, as an immediate Corol-
lary of Theorem 2; the proof of Theorem 3.II is given in Section 7.5. Like
the proof of Theorem 1.II, the proof Theorem 3.II involves embedding a
game in which acceptable bets exist on the common knowledge compo-
nents – the example of the two-player game from Lehrer and Samet (2011)
which appears in Section 4 – into the given structure, and then showing
that the acceptable bet for those two players on the image of the embedding
can be extended (on each component individually) to an acceptable bet for
all players (however many needed to give the desired common knowledge
structure) on the entire component.
4. MOTIVATING PARADOXES
4.1. The Ex Ante vs Interim Stage. Theorems 1, 2, and 3 may be mo-
tivated by several paradoxes related to Bayesian equilibria and common
priors, some of which have previously appeared in the literature. They all
revolve around the distinction between the ex ante stage and the interim
stage. Indeed, the main theorems here resolve these paradoxes by provid-
ing full characterisations of when these pathologies may occur and when
they are guaranteed not to appear.
The full state space, over which priors are defined, is usually taken to
be the ex ante stage while the common knowledge component represents
the interim stage after each player receives a signal. According to a widely
accepted view, in reality there is no chance move that selects a player’s
type. The true situation the players face is the interim stage after the vector
of types has been selected. However, incomplete information requires us to
consider the ex ante stage in order to understand how the players make their
choices in the interim stage, even though it is a fiction and there is no actual
distinction between the different stages.
The paradoxes here challenge that view, because in these examples player
behaviour is different depending on whether we are in the ex ante stage or
the interim stage. This is particularly striking in the third example. The
concept of ‘no acceptable bets’ can be extended to ‘no trading’ (Milgrom
and Stokey (1982)); the third example then shows that one can construct
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knowledge structures in which players cannot measurably agree to trade in
the ex ante stage but may agree to trade in the interim stage.
4.2. Paradoxes. The first two paradoxes, on Bayesian games and common
priors in over continuum type spaces, have been well-known in the literature
for about a decade. The third paradox, on no betting, is new.
4.2.1. The “Now You See It, Now You Don’t” Bayesian Equilibrium. Si-
mon (2003) and Hellman (2014a) present examples of Bayesian games over
continuum of states that have no Bayesian equilibria. In those games, there
is no profile of measurable strategies of the players, with those strategies
having as their domain the entire state space Ω, that forms a Bayesian equi-
librium.
However, in these games each common knowledge component C (ω0),
for any state ω0, is countable. Hence, the Bayesian game restricted to each
common knowledge component does have a Bayesian equilibrium, by stan-
dard arguments; e.g., (Simon, 2003, Prop. 1). In summary, there is no ex
ante Bayesian equilibrium but there do exist interim Bayesian equilibria.
4.2.2. The “Now You See It, Now You Don’t” Common Prior. This para-
dox was first noted in Simon (2000). We present here a slight variation of a
version appearing in Lehrer and Samet (2011).
Consider the following type space over a state space Ω, as depicted in
Figure 1. Ω is constructed out of four disjoint subsets of R2, labelled Aj for
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}:
• A1 = {(x, x+ 1) | −1 ≤ x < 0}
• A2 = {(x, x) | −1 ≤ x < 0}
• A3 = {(x, x− 1) | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}
• A4 = {(x, ψ(x)) | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}, where ψ(x) = x − c(mod 1) for a
fixed irrational c in (0, 1).
Player 1 is informed of the first coordinate of the state and player 2 is
informed of the second coordinate. Thus, the class of E1 containing ω –
denote it E1(ω) – consists of the two points on the vertical line that contains
the state ω. Similarly, E2(ω) contains the two points on the horizontal line
that includes the state ω.13
The posterior tiω for each of the two points in E
i(ω) is 1
2
. Furthermore, let
µ be the probability measure 1
4
∑4
j=1 ψj , where ψj is the Lebesgue measure
13 Formally, the knowledge relations are defined by
(x, y)E1(x′, y′)↔ x = x′, (x, y)E2(x′, y′)↔ y = y′
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FIGURE 1. The state space consists of the three diagonals
A1, A2, A3 and of A4. The latter is obtained by a rightward
shift of the top-right diagonal by an irrational number c.
over Aj . Lehrer and Samet (2011) show that measurability conditions are
satisfied by the posteriors and that µ is a common prior for (t1, t2).
However, although the entire space Ω has a well-defined common prior, if
we again concentrate on the common knowledge component C (ω0) of any
arbitrary state ω0 (fixing the posteriors) then there is no common prior14
over C (ω0). The reason for this is that C (ω0) is a doubly infinite countable
sequence
(4.1) . . . , ω−(k+1) , ω−k , . . . , ω−1 , ω0 , ω1 , . . . , ωk , ωk+1 , . . .
such that for all k ∈ Z, (ωk, ωk+1) ∈ E1 and (ωk, ωk−1) ∈ E2 or vice-
versa. Any common prior ν over C (ω0) must satisfy the condition that
ν(ωk) = ν(ωk+1) for all k. Thus all the countably many states in C (ω0)
must have the same probability, which is impossible.
In summary, there is an ex ante common prior but there does not exist an
interim common prior. In particular, in light of Theorem 2, it follows that
the common knowledge relation E generated in Figure 1 is not smooth. This
14 There may, however, be a common improper prior over C (ω0). An improper prior
allows for the possibility that the total measure it defines over a space diverges.
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FIGURE 2. Graphical depiction of an acceptable bet over a
common knowledge component of the type space depicted
in Figure 1. Player 1’s knowledge is represented by ellipses,
Player 2’s by rectangles.
could be seen by more elementary means: the restriction of E to any one
of the sets A1, A2, A3, A4 is equivalent to the equivalence relation induced
by an irrational rotational of the circle – i.e., x → x − c mod 1, c being
irrational – and this relation is well-known to be non-smooth.
4.2.3. The “Now You See It, Now You Don’t” Acceptable Bet. Equation
(3.1) states that when a bet is acceptable there is common knowledge ev-
erywhere that every player has expectation of positive gain, even though a
bet is everywhere zero sum by definition.
If there is a common prior over the entire space, then summing the inte-
grals and integrating over the entire space shows that there is no acceptable
bet (cf. a similar argument in Hellman (2014b)). By Theorem 7 in Feinberg
(2000) (see also Heifetz (2006)), if Ω is compact and we allow only con-
tinuous bets then the converse also holds, that is, if there is no acceptable
bet whose domain is the entire state space Ω then there must be a common
prior over Ω.
As there is a common prior over the entire space in the example depicted
in Figure 1, there can be no acceptable bet over the entire space. However,
one can construct acceptable bets on each common knowledge component
in this example. We concentrate on a particular state ω0 ∈ A1 as in the
figure, and the common knowledge component C (ω0) containing it; hence
(ω2k, ω2k+1) ∈ E1 and (ω2k, ω2k−1) ∈ E2 for all k ∈ Z (where the enumer-
ation follows the arrows in Figure 1). A variation of a construction from
Hellman (2014b), using C (ω0) as in (4.1), defines the following function
f : C (ω0)→ R:
f(ωn) =

0 if n = 0
(−1)n+1 ·∑ni=1 12i if n > 0
(−1)n ·∑−ni=1 12i if n < 0
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The function f is presented graphically in Figure 2. It is easy to check
that (f,−f) is an acceptable bet over C (ω0), even though there is no glob-
ally acceptable bet over the entire space Ω. In summary, there is no ex ante
betting but there is interim betting.
5. EXAMPLES OF SMOOTH AND NON-SMOOTH STRUCTURES
We present here some examples to illustrate the concept of smooth equiv-
alence relations. These examples are conceptually simpler than the ex-
amples underlying the paradoxes of Bayesian games given in Section 4.2.
We repeatedly use the criterion mentioned earlier and given by Proposition
1: smoothness of a CBER E is equivalent to the existence of a Borel set
B ⊆ Ω, known as a Borel transversal, which intersects each atom of E at
exactly one point.
We begin with some examples of smooth relations:
Example 1: The state space is Ω = R, with relation x ∼ y if and only if
x − y is an integer. In other words, a player is informed only of the values
after the decimal point for any x ∈ R, with the integer value hidden. This
relation is smooth.15 B = [0, 1) is a Borel transversal.
Example 2: Ω = R, with the atoms of the common knowledge class of the
form {±x + n | n ∈ Z}; this will be induced if one player’s knowledge
relation is x ∼1 −x, and the other player’s knowledge relation is as in the
first example, i.e., x ∼2 y iff x − y is an integer. The induced common
knowledge relation is again easily seen to be smooth by taking the Borel
transversal B = [0, 1
2
].
Example 3: If Ω = Ω1×Ω2, consider the relations (x, y) ∼1 (x′, y′) if and
only if x = x′ and (x, y) ∼2 (x′, y′) if and only if y = y′ are smooth; take
the transversals Ω1 × {y0} and {x0} ×Ω2 for some x0 ∈ Ω1, y0 ∈ Ω2. This
common knowledge relation refers to the case in which there is common
knowledge about one aspect of the state of nature but no knowledge about
the other.
Theorems 1, 2, and 3 then guarantee that for any type space with these
common knowledge relations, common priors exist on all components, Bayesian
equilibria exist regardless of the payoffs, and there are no agreeable bets on
15 In fact, one can prove a general theorem: if Ω is a Polish space with metric d, and E is
a CBER such that for each class A of E, inf
x 6=y, x,y∈A
d(x, y) > 0, then E is smooth. In other
words, as long as in each atom the elements ‘keep their distance’ and do not get ‘bunched
up’, the relation is smooth.
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any components. Finding the common priors and Bayesian equilibria, how-
ever, can be quite cumbersome, hence the advantage of possessing general
existence theorems such as those we present here.
We now turn to some non-smooth examples:
Example 4: Ω = R, with the common knowledge relation x ∼ y if and
only if x − y is rational. This common knowledge relation can be induced
if a third player is added to the structure in Example 2, with the knowledge
relation of this newly added third player given by x ∼3 y if and only if
x = my, where m is an integer.16 It is well known that in this structure
there does not exist a Borel transversal, (see, for example, (Rudin, 1986,
Ch. 2)).
Example 5: Ω = AZ for some finiteA and the relation is given by (xj)j∈Z ∼
(yk)k∈Z if and only if ∃m ∈ Z,∀n, xn = yn+m, i.e., the relation induced by
the shift. This common knowledge relation is induced when the state of
nature is represented by a doubly-infinite sequence of data elements in A
but there is uncertainty as to where the ‘middle’ point is. This relation is
well-known to be non-smooth.
Since the common knowledge structures above are not smooth, common
knowledge components may not possess common priors, Bayesian equilib-
ria may not exist for certain priors and payoffs, and for certain type struc-
tures – even those induced by a common prior – we may find acceptable bets
on components even though there are no globally acceptable bets. Again,
constructively coming to these conclusions in each separate case could be
extremely cumbersome, while Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of such
cases in a general manner.
We end with a generalisation of an appearing in Section 4. We include
Example 6 here to show that even when it is the case that when a player ob-
serves his own type he knows that the types of the other players are limited
to a finite number of possible points, the resulting knowledge structure may
be non-smooth.
Example 6: Let there be N players, and let Ω ⊆ RN be a finite union
∪nj=1Ωj such that each Ωj is a subset of a plane Pj of dimension n − 1 not
parallel to any axis; i.e., each Pj is of the form
{x ∈ Rn ∣∣ ∑ aixi = c} for some a1, . . . , an, c ∈ R, s.t. ai 6= 0 for all i.
Assume there is a common prior µ on each Ωj that is absolutely continu-
ous with respect to the n − 1-dimensional Lebesgue measure on Pj . The
16 E.g., the third player may not be sure if the value made known to him is the total
amount or the amount per person in a group of unknown size after the amount has been
divided.
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information structure is such that for each i, player i is informed of the i-th
coordinate, i.e.,
Ei := {((x1, . . . , xN), (y1, . . . , yN)) ∈ Ω× Ω ∣∣ xi = yi}
For each player, the knowledge classes are finite. The resulting knowledge
structure may be smooth but, as the examples of Section 4 show, may also
be non-smooth.
6. RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE
6.1. Type Spaces. Many papers on games of incomplete information, such
as Milgrom and Weber (1985), model players’ information by types. In such
modelling, each player i has a type space Ωi, with measurable structure Fi,
and the set of states of the world in their framework is Ω :=
∏
i Ωi with
a non-atomic common prior µ defined on a σ-algebra F containing ⊗iFi.
Players in this framework are told their own signals and then use that to
deduce a distribution on the states of the world via Bayesian updating with
respect to a common prior µ; we omit the technical details.
The model of Bayesian games studied in this paper can also be formu-
lated using type spaces. In our framework, each knowledge relation Ei is
smooth and the classes are level sets of the type function. Hence, by Propo-
sition 1 of the Appendix, the quotient space Ωi := Ω/Ei, which is the col-
lection of classes of Ei with the quotient σ-algebra, is standard Borel, i.e.,
a Polish space in some topology consistent with its measurable structure.
Equivalently, we can take Ωi to be the range of Player i’s type function.
A common prior µ on Ω then induces a common prior on
∏
i Ωi, itself a
quotient space of Ω.
6.2. Knowledge. An alternative approach to modelling knowledge and type
spaces on a continuum of states, going back to Nielson (1984) – see also
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) – is to model information using σ-algebras.
That is, player i’s knowledge is represented by a σ-algebra Fi, where it is
understood that two elements x, y are in the same information component
for player i whenever x ∈ B ∈ Fi implies that y ∈ B. (The connection to
a knowledge equivalence relation (Ei)i∈I from our framework is given by
Fi = σ(Ei).) We have avoided this approach for several reasons.
First of all, while that approach may be more appropriate for general
knowledge structures, when the types are purely atomic (and hence knowl-
edge classes are countable) it is more intuitive, in our opinion, to express
the knowledge of the players, as well as the common knowledge structures,
using equivalence relations. While it is true that our framework is set upon
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the background of measurable structures, it still echoes the standard parti-
tional approach to knowledge. The only reason we cannot directly extend
the standard approach is because we restrict ourselves to measurable sets.
Second, if one wishes to model continuum knowledge spaces based di-
rectly on knowledge σ-algebras, various serious technical problems arise.
For example, there is no guarantee each player’s knowledge components
are measurable, or more generally, that the saturation of a measurable set
with respect to a player’s knowledge (or the induced common knowledge
relation) is measurable. These problems are partially overcome by identify-
ing sets which differ by a set of measure 0, but – other than the fact that this
requires a common prior at the onset – this fix is useless for our purposes, as
we need to look at the individual common knowledge components, which
are generically of null measure.
6.3. Equilibrium Existence. Given the technical difficulties discussed in
the previous subsection that are encountered in dealing with general knowl-
edge structures, results on equilibrium existence in general knowledge struc-
tures are almost non-existent. One seminal positive result that does establish
the existence of equilibrium is Milgrom and Weber (1985).
As discussed in Section 6.1, Milgrom and Weber (1985) models incom-
plete information using types, and our framework can directly be translated
into that framework. The notion of strategies in Milgrom and Weber (1985)
also differs from the definition used here; they use distributional strategies
in contrast to the definition of strategies given above in Section 2.6. This
is also not a serious difference; Balder (1988) similarly proves equilibrium
existence for the same class of games in the class of strategies of the ‘more
classical’ sense used here.
However – and here is where the real substantive difference lies – Mil-
grom and Weber (1985) then go on to assume that the common prior µ is
absolutely continuous with respect to ⊗iµi, with µi being the marginal on
Ωi. Unless the common prior is purely atomic, this assumption clearly im-
plies that types cannot be purely atomic, and hence this assumption, which
guarantees existence of Bayesian equilibrium, is not satisfied in our frame-
work.
Following Stinchcombe (2011a), denoting the class of games in which µ
is not absolutely continuous with respect to a product measure by DIS (for
discontinuous information structure), the results of this paper relate solely
to a subclass of DIS. In contrast, the class of games in Milgrom and Weber
(1985) are precisely those that are disjoint from DIS.
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Stinchcombe (2011a) also studies structures within the DIS class. That
paper defines a structure of beliefs to have a subset satisfying continu-
ously distributed informational commonality (or, CIC), if on a non-null
subset at least two players can agree on a non-atomically distributed vari-
able; formally, if there is a set B ⊆ Ω which is common knowledge (i.e.,
B ∈ ∩jσ(Ej), recalling notation from Section 6.1) with µ(B) > 0; players
i, j ∈ I; and a Borel mapping φ : B → [0, 1] which is σ(Ei) ∩ σ(Ej)-
measurable (in B), such that φ∗ ◦ µ := µ ◦ φ−1 is non-atomic.17 Denoting
the class of information structures that contain CIC’s by CIC, Theorem A
of Stinchcombe (2011a) shows that CIC ⊆ DIS.18 By definition, smooth
games are in CIC.19
Non-membership in the class DIS guarantees equilibrium by Milgrom
and Weber (1985). However, within DIS, membership or non-membership
in CIC has no direct implications for the existence of MBE. On the one
hand, a two-player game that is ergodic (that is, the only common knowl-
edge sets are of µ-measure 0 or 1) is not in CIC; an example of this is the
game in Hellman (2014b), which is ergodic and has no equilibria. On the
other hand, it is easy to construct games with no equilibria in which two
players have identical knowledge, which places them within CIC; e.g., to
the game from Hellman (2014b), add dummy players with perfect informa-
tion.
Theorem B of Stinchcombe (2011a) shows that for games in CIC with
generic payoff functions the expected payoffs of the players will not be con-
tinuous as functions of the strategy profiles (where the strategies, viewed as
maps from type spaces to mixed actions which are measurable with respect
to players’ information, are endowed with the weak-∗ topology induced by
µ). As previously mentioned, every smooth Bayesian game is in CIC, while
Theorem 1 of this paper shows that every such game has an MBE. Thus,
games with purely atomic types and smooth common knowledge relations
form an interesting class: although generically the expected payoffs of such
games are not continuous, measurable Bayesian equilibria are still guaran-
teed to exist. The relationships betweenDIS and CIC and their implications
for Bayesian equilibrium existence are summarised graphically in Figure 3.
We also mention in passing Stinchcombe (2011b), which shows the ex-
istence of correlated equilibrium. In that framework, actions are a function
17 I.e., for each x ∈ [0, 1], µ({ω ∈ B | φ(ω) = x}) = 0.
18 The theorem requires that the knowledge σ-algebras of at least two players support
non-atomic measures; this holds by construction in our set up as all player’s knowledge
relations are smooth; see Proposition 1.
19 All Polish spaces are Borel isomorphic.
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Not in DIS,
All Games Have Equilibria, see Milgrom and Weber (1985)
DIS But Not CIC
CIC ⊆ DIS
Purely Atomic Games w/ Smooth CK Relation,
Equilibria Exist by Theorem 1
Some Games w/o Equilibria
(e.g., Hellman (2014b))
Some Games w/o Equilibria
(e.g., Some Players w/ Identical Knowledge)
FIGURE 3. A representation of the inter-relationships be-
tween DIS and CIC and the implications of these properties
for the existence of equilibria.
not only of types but also of a public signal chosen uniformly in [0, 1]. In-
terestingly, the proof there shows that MBE exists in all Bayesian games if
one allows for saturated measurable structures, i.e., structures constructed
using non-standard analysis. Such extensions, however, are highly non-
constructive.
7. APPENDIX: TOOLS AND PROOFS
7.1. Mathematical Tools. Recall that [T ]E denotes the saturation of T
with respect to a CBER E, i.e., the smallest union of classes of E containing
T . In terms that may be more familiar to game theorists used to working
with finite partitions, [ω]E is the knowledge component containing ω. Re-
call that a transversal of an equivalence relation is a set that intersects each
equivalence class at exactly one point.
Given a Polish Ω and a CBER E, we let Ω/E denote the quotient space
whose elements are the equivalence classes by E, and the induced σ-algebra
consists of precisely the images of the E-saturated sets in Ω under the quo-
tient map.
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We will make repeated use of the following proposition, which follows
from Propositions 6.3 and 6.4 of Kechris and Miller (2004) and the discus-
sion preceding them.
Proposition 1. The following conditions are equivalent for a CBER E on a
Polish space Ω:
(a) E is smooth.
(b) There is a Borel transversal for E.
(c) The quotient space Ω/E is standard Borel.20
Proposition 2 follows from21 Theorem 1 of Blackwell and Ryll-Nardzewski
(1963):
Proposition 2. If E is a smooth CBER on a Polish space Ω and µ ∈ ∆(Ω),
then there exists a proper RCD t of µ given σ(E).
Proposition 3 is a slight variation of the Lusin-Novikov theorem (e.g.,
(Kechris, 1995, Thm. 18.10)):
Proposition 3. Let E be a CBER on a Polish space Ω. Then there are Borel
functions (fn)∞n=1 : Ω→ Ω such that for all ω ∈ Ω, {fn(ω)}n∈N = [ω]E.
From this (or related results) one can deduce by standard techniques; see,
e.g., (Dougherty et al., 1994, Thm. 5.1).
Proposition 4. Let E be a smooth CBER on a Polish space Ω, and let S be
a countably infinite set. Then there is a Borel mapping Φ : Ω → S such
that for each E-class C of Ω, then the restriction Φ|C : C → S is injective,
and Φ(C) = S if C is infinite.
We also recall the following well-known result, of which we will make
repeated implicit use:
Proposition 5. Let X, Y be Polish spaces, and let f : X → Y be Borel
such that for each y ∈ Y , f−1(y) is at most countable (i.e., the map is
countable-to-one). Then for each Borel B ⊆ X , f(B) is Borel.
Let τ be a type space with knowledge relations (Ei)i∈I . For each i ∈ I
and each set N ⊆ Ω, let Ci(N) denote the saturation of N with respect to
Ei, i.e., Ci(N) = [N ]Ei . For each finite sequence iˆ = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ I∗ :=
∪n≥0In and N ⊆ Ω, let
C iˆ(N) = Cik
(
Cik−1
( · · · (Ci1(N)) · · · ))
20 That is, there is a measurable bijection between it and a Polish space.
21 The condition given there for the existence of proper RCD’s is easily seen to fol-
low from the existence of a Borel transversal, which, by Proposition 1, follows from
smoothness.
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and
C (N) = ∪iˆ∈I∗C iˆ(N)
which is the smallest common knowledge set containingN . Since by Propo-
sitions 4 and 5 the saturation of Borel sets under a CBER is also Borel, we
have:
Lemma 6. If N is Borel, then so is Ci(N) for each i ∈ I and so is C (N).
The following justifies our restriction to positive type spaces:
Proposition 7. If t is a proper RCD of µ with respect to σ(E) for a CBER
E, then
µ({ω | tω[ω] = 0}) = 0
In particular, if τ is a type space (not necessarily positive) with a common
prior µ, then for each i ∈ I ,
µ({ω ∈ Ω | tiω[ω] = 0}) = 0
Proof. Denote N = {ω | tω[ω] = 0}. Since tω[ω′] = 0 if (ω, ω′) /∈ E, and
tω[ω
′] = 0 for all the countably many ω′ with (ω, ω′) ∈ E since ω → tω
is σ(E)-measurable, we see that tω[N ] = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. The proposition
follows from the definition of an RCD. 
The following definition and its properties can be found in (Dougherty et
al., 1994, Sec. 3):
Definition 9. Let E be a CBER on a Polish space Ω. A measure µ ∈ ∆(Ω) is
called E-quasi-invariant if for any Borel setA ⊆ Ω, µ(A) = 0 iff µ([A]E) =
0.
Lemma 8. Let E be a CBER on a Polish space Ω, and t a proper RCD
of µ ∈ ∆(Ω) given σ(E). Then t is positive on an E-saturated set of full
measure iff µ is E-quasi-invariant.
Proof. Assume µ is E-quasi-invariant. Denoting N = {ω | tω[ω] = 0},
Proposition 7 implies that µ(N) = 0; so µ([N ]E) = 0. Therefore, t is
positive on the E-saturated set of full measure Ω\[N ]E.
Conversely, if t is positive on a E-saturated set of full measure X , then
for Borel A ⊆ Ω with µ(A) = 0, denoting B = A ∩X ,
(7.1) 0 = µ(A) ≥ µ(B) =
∫
Ω
tω(B)dµ(ω) =
∫
[B]E
tω(B)dµ(ω)
since tω(B) = 0 for ω /∈ [B]E. Since t is positive inX , tω(B) > 0 inB, and
hence in [B]E as ω → tω is σ(E)-measurable. Hence, by (7.1), µ([B]E) = 0,
and hence finally µ([A]E) = 0, as [A]E ⊆ [B]E ∪ (Ω\X). 
BAYESIAN GAMES WITH A CONTINUUM OF STATES 24
If (Ω,E) and (Λ,D) are Polish spaces with induced Borel equivalence
relations E and D, (Ω,E) is said to be embeddable into (Λ,D) if there
is an injective Borel mapping ψ : Ω → Λ such that for all ω, η ∈ Ω,
ωEη ⇐⇒ ψ(ω)Dψ(η); in this case, we denote (Ω,E) @ (Λ,D).
A CBER is said to be hyperfinite, Dougherty et al. (1994), if it is induced
by the action of a Borel Z-action on Ω; i.e., if there is a bijective22 Borel
mapping T : Ω→ Ω such that xEy ⇐⇒ ∃n ∈ Z, T n(x) = y.
Proposition 9. Let E1, E2 be non-smooth CBER’s on Polish spaces Ω1,Ω2,
with E1 being hyperfinite. Then (Ω1,E1) @ (Ω2,E2).
Proof. Since E2 is non-smooth, the Glimm-Effros dichotomy for CBER’s
(see Harrington et al. (1990), or (Dougherty et al., 1994, Thm. 3.4)) implies
that there is a universal hyperfinite CBER23 (Ω0,E0) such that (Ω0,E0) @
(Ω2,E2). By Theorem 7.1 of Dougherty et al. (1994), any two non-smooth
hyperfinite equivalence relations can be embedded into each other, hence
(Ω1,E1) @ (Ω0,E0). Hence, (Ω1,E1) @ (Ω2,E2). 
7.2. Embedding of Games. Proposition 10 is the primary tool needed for
the proofs of Theorems 1.II and 3.II.
Proposition 10. Let Ω and X be Polish spaces, and let E be a CBER on
Ω which is non-smooth and belief induced. Let τX = (X, J, (t
j
X)j∈J) be
an everywhere finitely supported and positive type space with a common
prior µX , and assume that its common knowledge equivalence relation EX
is hyperfinite. Then one can construct a Borel embedding ψ : X → Ω
and a set of players I , such that J ⊂ I , along with an everywhere finitely
supported and positive type space τ = (Ω, I, (ti)i∈I) possessing a common
prior µ for which:
• E is the common knowledge relation induced by the type space τ .
• tjψ(·) = ψ∗((tjX)(·)) for each j ∈ J in X; explicitly, for ω, ω′ ∈ Y ,
tjψ(ω)[ψ(ω
′)] = (tjX)ω[ω
′].
• For j ∈ J and ω /∈ ψ(X), tjω = δω, i.e., the Dirac measure at ω.
• ψ∗(µX) := µX ◦ ψ−1  µ, and ψ∗(µX)(A) = µ(A) for A ∈ σ(E).
The middle two points say that for each player j ∈ J , his type function
on X becomes his type function on ψ(X), and he has perfect knowledge
on Ω\ψ(X). Note in particular that if ω1EXω2 then ψ(ω1)Eψ(ω2). The last
22 If a Borel mapping between Polish spaces is injective, then by Proposition 5, its
inverse is also Borel.
23 Ω0 = 2
N, E0 is the tail equivalence relation; (Dougherty et al., 1994, Cor. 8.2) shows
this to be hyperfinite.
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point says that the prior induced on Ω by µX is absolutely continuous with
respect to the final common prior µ, and they agree on E-saturated sets.
Proof. Since EX is hyperfinite, by Proposition 9 there is an embedding ψ :
(X,EX) v (Ω,E). Denote Φ = ψ(X) and Ω0 = [Φ]E = [ψ(X)]E; both Φ
and Ω0 are Borel by Propositions 3 and 5.
Since E is belief induced, by Proposition 18 there exist a set of players
K and smooth CBERs (Ek)k∈K with finite classes such that E is induced
by (Ek)k∈K . For j ∈ J , define the knowledge relations
Ej =
{
(x, y) | (x = y) ∨ (x, y ∈ ψ(X) ∧ (ψ−1(x), ψ−1(y)) ∈ EjX)}
i.e., Ej is induced by EjX on ψ(X) and player j has perfect knowledge
outside of Φ. Define I := K ∪ J . By construction, E is induced by (Ei)i∈I ,
since it is induced by (Ei)i∈I\J and Ej refines E for j ∈ J .
Denote by E0 = EΩ0 , EΦ = E|Φ the restrictions of E to Ω0 = [Φ]E and Φ,
respectively. For brevity, let µˆ = ψ∗(µX) := µX ◦ φ−1; µˆ is then EΦ-quasi-
invariant, by the assumption that µX is positive and by Proposition 8. By
(Dougherty et al., 1994, Prop. 3.1), there exists an E0-quasi-invariant mea-
sure ν on Ω0 satisfying µˆ ν and satisfying µˆ(A) = ν(A) for A ∈ σ(E).
Observe the following string of implications for a set A ⊆ Ω:
(7.2)
µˆ(A) = 0→ µˆ([A ∩ Φ]EΦ) = 0→ µˆ([A ∩ Φ]E) = 0→ ν([A ∩ Φ]E) = 0
where the first implication is because µˆ is EΦ-quasi-invariant, the second as
[A∩Φ]E ⊆ [A∩Φ]EΦ ∪ (Ω\Φ), and the last since ν, µˆ agree on E-saturated
sets. Also,
(7.3) ν(A\Φ) = 0→ ν([A\Φ]E) = 0→ µˆ([A\Φ]E) = 0
where the first implication is because ν is E-quasi-invariant, and the last
since µˆ ν.
We deal now with two cases to construct µ to be quasi-invariant:
If ν(Φ) = 1, let µ = µˆ. Then if A ⊆ Ω with µ(A) = 0, then ν(A\Φ) ≤
ν(Ω\Φ) = 0 and µˆ(A) = 0. It follows that since [A]E = [A∩Φ]E∪ [A\Φ]E,
we have µ([A]E) = 0 by (7.2) and (7.3).
Otherwise, if ν(Φ) < 1, set
µ =
1
2
µˆ+
1
2
ν(· | Ω0\Φ)
If µ(A) = 0, then clearly we also have µˆ(A) = 0 and ν(A\Φ) = 0, and
then, as above, µ([A]E) = 0.
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Either way, µ is E0-quasi-invariant. Now, for i ∈ I\J , let ti be a proper
RCD of µ with respect to Ei, which exists by Proposition 2. By Lemma 8, it
is positive on an Ei-saturated set of full µ-measure, and can be modified on
a µ-null set to be positive everywhere.24 Clearly, for j ∈ J , tj as defined in
the statement of the proposition is a positive proper RCD of µ with respect
to Ej , since µ(·|Φ) = µˆ(· | Φ).

7.3. Proof of Theorem 1.
Fix a countably infinite set S. LetB denote the collection of all I-tuples
(si, gi)i∈I for which (S, I, A, (si, gi)i∈I) constitutes a positive Bayesian game,
with (si) denoting the types and (gi) denoting the payoff functions. B is
endowed with the topology of point-wise convergence:25 for each α in a
directed set, denote by Υα a pair (siα, g
i
α)i∈I of I-tuples of types and payoff
functions associated to α by a net. Then Υα → Υ = (si, gi)i∈I in B if for
every player i ∈ I , every ω ∈ S, and every pure action profile a ∈ ∏i∈I Ai
one has giα(ω, a)→ gi(ω, a) and siα(ω)→ si(ω).
Proposition 11. B is homeomorphic to a Borel subset of Ξ :=
(
∆(S) ×
R
∏
i∈I A
i)S×I and hence is Polish (in some topology that induces the same
Borel structure).
The simple intuition is that for each player and state pair (s, i) ∈ S×I , we
need to specify an element in ∆(S) as well as an element ofR
∏
i∈I A
i , which
specifies what payoff that player will receive as a result of each possible
action profile.
Henceforth, we will identifyB with some such fixed subset of Ξ.
Proof. Write B =
∏
i∈I(B
i
s × Big), where Bis (resp. Big) denotes the
projection of B to the space of types (resp. payoffs) for Player i, with
the induced topologies. It suffices to show that Bis is homeomorphic to a
Borel subset of
(
∆(S)
)S and that Big is homeomorphic to Borel subset of
RS×
∏
i∈I A
i .
The latter claim is trivial once one notices that for any countable set C
the set of bounded functions in RC is Borel, as it can be written
∪n∈N ∩c∈C {a ∈ RC
∣∣ |ac| ≤ n}.
and that the Tychonoff topology is indeed the required topology of point-
wise convergence.
24 Since Ei has finite classes, over a µ-null set of Ei classes let ti be uniform in each
class.
25 We define the topology in terms of nets.
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We next turn to the former claim. As mentioned above, the intuition de-
scribing the map fromBis to
(
∆(S)
)S is to specify the beliefs of Player i in
each state. Hence, the image ofBis under such a map is given by the subset
of Ξ defined by two conditions: they satisfy positivity and they are constant
over their support. Mathematically, these conditions are, respectively:
∩ω∈S {si ∈
(
∆(S)
)S | siω[ω] > 0}⋂
∩ω,η,ζ∈S{si ∈
(
∆(S)
)S | siω[η] > 0→ siω(ζ) = siη[ζ]}
and, again the topology is the topology of point-wise convergence. 
Denote by Σ :=
∏
i∈I Σ
i the space of strategy profiles over (S, I, A).
The space Σi of strategies for Player i on the countable space S is clearly a
compact subspace of (∆(Ai))S , hence Σ is a compact space in the induced
topology.
Proposition 12. The Bayesian equilibrium correspondence BE : B → Σ
has a Borel graph and takes on compact non-empty values.
Proof. The fact that every Bayesian game with a countable state space has
at least one Bayesian equilibrium follows from standard fixed point argu-
ments; see, e.g., Simon (2003). The fact that the set of Bayesian equilibria
is compact also follows by standard arguments. To show that the graph G
of the BE correspondence is Borel, note that:26
G = {((si, gi)i∈I , σ) ∈ B× Σ | ∀ω ∈ S,∀i ∈ I,∀b ∈ Ai,∑
v∈S
gi(v, σ(ω))siω[v] ≥
∑
v∈S
gi(v, b, σ−p(ω))siω[v]}

Corollary 13. There exists a Borel mapping ψ : B → Σ such that for all
Λ ∈ B, ψ(Λ) is a Bayesian equilibrium of Λ.
The proof of Corollary 13 follows immediately from Proposition 12 and
the selection theorem of Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski (1965) (see also
Himmelberg (1975)).
Recalling that C (ω) is the common knowledge component containing a
state ω, denote by s|C (ω) the restriction of the collection of types to the do-
main C (ω) and g|C (ω) the same with respect to the payoff functions. Given
two Bayesian games
(S, I, A, sS, gS) and (T, I, A, sT , gT )
26 The quantifiers are all countable here.
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FIGURE 4. The mapping Φ
with finite or countable state spaces and the same player and action sets, an
embedding from S to T is an injective mapping φ : S → T such that:
• For all ω ∈ S, i ∈ I and pure action profiles x, giS(ω, x) = giT (φ(ω), x).
• For all ω, η ∈ S and i ∈ I , (siS)ω[η] = (siT )φ(ω)[φ(η)].
Note that ψ(S) is then common knowledge in the type space sT . Intu-
itively, the Bayesian game (S, I, A, sS, gS) is copied isomorphically to the
Bayesian game (φ(S), I, A, s|φ(S), g|φ(S)).
Proposition 14. Let Γ = (Ω, I, A, t, r) be a Bayesian game such that the
common knowledge relation E is smooth. LetB = B(S, I, A) be the set of
Bayesian games that all share some same countable state space S and the
same player and action space as Γ. Then there is a Borel map Φ : Ω → S
and a Borel map27 Λ : Ω/E→ B such that for each ω ∈ Ω, if we denote
Γω = (C (ω), I, A, t|C (ω), r|C (ω))
then Φ|C (ω) is an embedding of Γω in Λ(C (ω)).
See Figure 4. Note that for some ω, C (ω) may be finite, in which case
Φ|C (ω) will not be surjective.
27 Ω/E is standard Borel by Proposition 1.
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Proof. Let Φ : Ω → S be as in Proposition 4; i.e., Borel, and injective in
each equivalence class.28 We can then define Λ(q) = (giq, s
i
q)i∈I for each
common knowledge component q ∈ Ω/E by
giq(Φ(ω), x) = r
i(ω, x)
giq(s, x) ≡ 0, ∀s ∈ S\Φ(q)
and
(siq)Φ(ω)[Φ(η)] = t
i
ω[η]
(siq)s = δs, ∀s ∈ S\Φ(q)
where δs denotes the Dirac measure at s, i.e., players get payoff 0 and have
perfect knowledge outside of the image of Φ on q. It is straightforward to
check that Φ and Λ so defined satisfy the requirements. 
Proof of Theorem 1.I. Let ψ : B → Σ = (∏i∈I ∆(Ai))S be a Bayesian
equilibrium selection as in Corollary 13. Let Φ,Λ be as in Proposition 14.
For each ω ∈ Ω, define
σ(ω) = ψ(Λ(C (ω)))(Φ(ω))
i.e., at stage ω, σ plays as the equilibrium that ψ chooses for the game
Λ(C (ω)) at state Φ(ω). Such σ is then an MBE. 
Proof of Theorem 1.II. Let ΓX = (X, {1, 2}, {L,R}×{L,R}, t1X , t2X , r1X , r2X),
with X = {−1, 1} × 2N, be the two-player game presented in Hellman
(2014a), with state space X = {−1, 1} × 2N, which does not possess
an ε-MBE for sufficiently small ε; fix some such ε > 0. We recall the
common knowledge relation EX in this game: Define SX : X → X by
SX(x0, x1, x2, x3, . . .) = (−x0, x2, x3, x4, . . .). EX is then the equivalence
relation on X given by
EX = {(x, y) | ∃k,m ≥ 0, SkX(x) = SmX (y)}
This relation is hyperfinite by Corollary 8.2 of Dougherty et al. (1994).
Let ψ : X → Ω denote an embedding as in Proposition 10 with the
induced positive type space τ = (Ω, I, (ti)i∈I) on Ω and a common prior µ
satisfying ψ∗(µX) µ. Define the payoffs:
rj(ω, x) =
{
rjX(ψ
−1(ω, x)) if j = 1, 2 and ω ∈ ψ(X)
0 otherwise
By the properties of ΓX and ε listed above, and the properties of ψ listed in
Proposition 10, the game
Γ = (Ω, {L,R}I , I, t1, t2, t3, . . . , tI , r1, r2, r3, . . . , rI)
28 The surjectivity in each infinite equivalence class is not needed here.
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does not possess an ε-MBE. 
7.4. Proof of Theorem 2.
Recall the notion of a restriction of a type space from Section 3.2. Also
recall that a subset A of a Polish space X is analytic if it the the projection
of a Borel set in X × Y for some Polish space Y .
Lemma 15. The correspondence Ω→ ∆(Ω) given by
Ψ(ω) = {ν ∈ ∆a(Ω) |ν(C (ω)) = 1
and ν|C (ω) is a common prior for τC (ω)}
has an analytic graph in Ω⊗∆(Ω) and |Ψ(ω)| ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. The fact that |Ψ(ω)| ≤ 1 (i.e., that on a countable space in which
no proper non-empty subset is common knowledge there exists at most one
common prior) is precisely Proposition 3 of Hellman and Samet (2012).
Let (fn) be as in Proposition 3. Define Φi : Ω→ ∆(Ω) by
Ψi(ω) = conv(ti(fj(ω)) | j ∈ N}
to be the convex hull of the priors for Player i over those knowledge compo-
nents contained in the common knowledge component of ω. Then Gr(Ψi)
is the projection of the Borel set Ai ⊆ Ω×∆(N)×∆(Ω) given by
Ai = {(ω, η, ν) ∈ Ω×∆(N)×∆(Ω) | ν =
∑
j∈N
η[j] · ti(fj(ω))}
Finally, it is known (e.g. Samet (1998b)) that Ψ(ω) = ∩iΨi(ω); hence,
Gr(Ψ) = ∩iGr(Φi); and the finite intersection of analytic sets is analytic.

Proof of Theorem 2. Clearly, property (3) implies property (2). Suppose
(2) holds; then, for Ψ as in Lemma 15, |Ψ(ω)| = 1 for µ-a.e. ω ∈ Ω -
and Ψ is clearly constant on each class of E. Since Gr(Ψ) is analytic, Ψ
is a µ-measurable function on {ω | Ψ(ω) 6= ∅}, e.g., (Kechris, 1995, Thm.
21.10). Hence, after restricting Ψ to some X ∈ σ(E) of full µ-measure,
the graph of Ψ defines a Borel function ψ : X → ∆(Ω), constant on each
E-class but different on different E-classes. Hence E|X is smooth.
Finally, assume property (1) holds and assume w.l.o.g. that Ω = X . By
Proposition 2, there is a µ-a.e. proper RCD t for µ given σ(E). The claim
that t is a common prior on µ-a.e. component follows now from Proposition
16 below, which states formally the commutativity of the diagram in Figure
5.

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µ
RCD w.r.t. σ(E)
//
RCD w.r.t. σ(Ei)
$$
t
RCD w.r.t. σ(Ei|C) for each E−class C

ti
FIGURE 5. The commutative diagram
Proposition 16. Let E,D be smooth CBER’s on a Polish space Ω, with D
refining E (that is, D ⊆ E; the classes of D are contained in classes of E),
let µ be a regular Borel probability measure on Ω, and let tE, tD be proper
RCD’s of µ with respect to σ(E), σ(D) respectively. Then, for µ-a.e. ω ∈ Ω,
for all Borel A ⊆ Ω,
(7.4) tEω(A | [ω]D) = tDω (A)
Proof. Example 4 of (Chang and Pollard, 1997, p. 297) shows that for µ-
a.e. E-class C, tD|C (the type function tD restricted to C) is a proper RCD
of tE|C given σ(D|C) (where D|C is the restriction of the relation D to C);
this clearly implies the proposition. 
7.5. Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.I. By Theorem 2, almost every common knowledge
component K has a common prior of the restricted type space τK . This is
sufficient, by Theorem 1.a. in Hellman (2014b), to conclude that there can
be no acceptable bet over τK for such generic K. 
Proof of Theorem 3.II. We first note that the conclusion of Theorem 3.II
applies to the example ΓX given in Section 4.2.3, as explained there, and in
fact using only two players. Denote the type space there (X, {1, 2}, (t1X , t2X))
with knowledge relations (E1X ,E
2
X). The common knowledge equivalence
relation EX is hyperfinite, as it is clearly induced by a Z-action.
Suppose a countable space K is given with a type space. For our con-
struction, we will want to work a bit more generally with acceptable bets on
arbitrary subsets L ⊆ K of states and subset J ⊆ I of players. To this end,
for a bounded function f : L → R denote by f the extension of f to K by
f(ω) = 0 for ω /∈ L. Then we will say that (f j)j∈J is an acceptable bet for
J on L if (compare with (3.1))∑
i∈J
f i(ω) = 0, Ej[f
j | ω] > 0, ∀j ∈ J, ω ∈ L
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Now, returning to the example ΓX , and given a non smooth belief-induced
CBER E on Ω, let ψ : X → Ω denote an embedding as in Proposition 10
with induced finitely supported positive type space τ = (Ω, I, t) on Ω and
common prior µ satisfying ψ∗(µX)  µ. Let K be a common knowledge
component in τ such that ψ−1(K) is one of those components in τX on
which there is an acceptable bet (f1, f2) (with f2 = −f1). By assumption,
this is true for µ-almost every component K, since it is true for µX-almost
every component in X (in fact, for every component), and µ and ψ∗(µX)
have the same E-saturated null sets. Hence, we also have an acceptable bet
for these players L := {1, 2} on ψ(ψ−1(K)) ⊆ K, and we need to show
that there is an acceptable bet on the entire component K for all players:
Proposition 17. Let ΓK = (K, I, t) be a countable type space,29 with
finitely supported types,30 such that K does not strictly contain any non-
empty common knowledge component. Let L ⊆ K and J ⊆ I , and suppose
there is an acceptable bet (gj)j∈J for J on L. Then there is an acceptable
bet for all the players in I on all of K.
Proof. First, we show how to define an acceptable bet on the subset L for
all players (in case I 6= J). Fix a player i0 ∈ J . Choose a strictly positive
function h : L→ R such that
Ei0 [h | ω] < Ei0 [f i0 | ω],∀ω ∈ L
It’s easy to see this is possible, as types are finitely supported and 0 <
Ei0 [f i0 | ω], for all ω ∈ L. Then define (g′i)i∈I on L by
g′i =

gi if i ∈ J, i 6= i0
gi − h if i = i0
h · 1|I|−|J | if i ∈ I, i /∈ J
It’s easy to check (g′i)i∈I is an acceptable bet on L.
Now, we proceed inductively and keep enlarging the domainL of (g′i)i∈I :
Let ω0 ∈ K\L and i0 ∈ I be such that Ci0(ω0) ∩ L 6= ∅, where we recall
that Ci0(ω0) is the knowledge component of i0 containing ω0. If there are
no such i0 and ω0 then we are done by the assumption that there are no
proper subsets which are common knowledge. Let γ > 0 be such that
ti0(ω0)[ω0] · γ < Ei0 [g′j|ω0]
29 Positivity is not needed for this proposition.
30 Indeed, in our case, the types are finitely supported and positive, as they are derived
via Proposition 10 and the example of Section 4.2.3.
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which exists as Ei0 [g′j|ω0] > 0, and define (g′i)i∈I at ω0 by
g′i(ω0) =
{ −γ if i = i0
γ
|I|−1 if i 6= i0.
(g′i)i∈I is an acceptable bet on L ∪ {ω0}. Now repeat the procedure with
L ∪ {ω0} replacing L, and so forth, until no states are left. The resulting
profile is clearly zero-summ but with positive expectation for each player at
each stage. 

8. APPENDIX: BELIEF-INDUCED RELATIONSHIPS
We have in several places relied on the fact that a belief induced relation
can always be assumed to by generated by types that are finitely supported.
We formally state and prove this proposition here:
Proposition 18. A CBER E is belief induced if and only if there are CBER’s
E1, . . . ,Em with finite classes that generate E.
It suffices to show this for each player separately (in a profile of players
whose beliefs induce E):
Lemma 19. If E is a smooth CBER, then there are CBER’s E1,E2 with finite
classes which generate E.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 4 that there is Borel Φ : Ω → N such
that for each class C of E, Φ|C : C → N is an injection. Let D1,D2 be two
finite equivalence relations on N such that the relation generated by D1,D2
has only one class. E.g.,
D1 = {(0, 1), (2, 3), (4, 5), . . .}, D2 = {(0), (1, 2), (3, 4), . . .}
and define
Ej = {(x, y) ∈ E | (Φ(x),Φ(y)) ∈ Dj}

As previously mentioned, there are CBER’s which cannot be induced
by finitely many smooth CBER’s. This can be shown using the concept
of the cost of a CBER E with an invariant31 measure µ. We briefly recall
this concept; for a more comprehensive treatment, see Kechris and Miller
(2004).
31 A (not-necessarily finite) measure is E-invariant if for every Borel bijection f : Ω→
Ω satisfying f(ω)Eω for all ω ∈ E, it holds that for all Borel A ⊆ Ω, µ(f−1(A)) = µ(A).
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A Borel graph G on a Polish space Ω is a Borel relation on Ω (i.e., a
Borel subset of Ω × Ω) that is irreflexive and symmetric. A Borel graph G
induces a Borel equivalence relation E on Ω: E is the reflexive and transitive
closure of G. We say that G spans E. Given such a graph, for each v ∈ Ω,
let dG(v) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞} denote the degree of v, i.e., the cardinality of
the set {w ∈ Ω | (v, w) ∈ G}. Clearly, if dG(v) is countable for all v ∈ Ω,
then so is the induced CBER E, and every CBER is spanned by some Borel
graph with vertices of countable degree (the relation itself).
The cost of a CBER E (with respect to an invariant measure µ) is defined
as:
Cµ(E) := inf{1
2
∫
Ω
dG(ω)dµ(ω) | G spans E}
A result of Levitt, e.g. (Kechris and Miller, 2004, Ch. 20), is that if T
is a Borel transversal for a CBER E with an E-invariant measure µ, then
Cµ(E) = µ(Ω\T ); in particular, if µ is finite and E is smooth (and hence
possesses a Borel transversal by Proposition 1), then Cµ(E) <∞.
Suppose that E is a CBER and furthermore that E is generated by E1, . . . ,En
(that is, the coarsest equivalence relation that each Ek refines). Let µ be
E-invariant and finite. Then µ is clearly also Ek invariant for each k =
1, . . . , n, and it’s easy to see that32
Cµ(E) ≤
n∑
k=1
Cµ(Ek)
Combining this observation with the result of Levitt, we see that if E1, . . . ,En
are smooth, Cµ(E) is finite.
Hence, to show a non-belief induced CBER, it suffices to find a CBER
with infinite cost with respect to some invariant measure E on it. A result of
Gaboriau (see (Kechris and Miller, 2004, Corrollary 27.10)) states that if E
is a CBER with finite invariant measure µ, and T is a Borel tree33 that spans
of E, then Cµ(E) = 12
∫
Ω
dT(ω)dµ(ω).
Now, let F∞ denote the free (non-abelian) group with countably many
generators. This group acts on 2F∞ via (f(x))(g) = x(f · g) for x ∈ 2F∞ ,
f, g ∈ F∞, and induces a CBER by x ∼ y iff ∃g ∈ F∞ with g · x = y.
From this, one deduces easily that if µ =
∏
f∈F∞(
1
2
, 1
2
) (which is clearly
E-invariant) then Cµ(E) =∞ by Gaboriau’s result.
32 If G1, . . . , Gn span E1, . . . ,En, respectively, then G = ∪nk=1Gn spans E.
33 A Borel tree is a Borel graph with no cycles.
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